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Abstract
The notion of state capacity has attracted renewed interest over the last
few years, in particular in the study of violent conflict. Yet, state capacity
is conceived differently depending on whether the interest lies in the state’s
power to discourage violent conflict, in its ability to administer efficiently,
or simply in its capacity to foster economic development. In this article, we
examine the links between state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy, and
discuss the conditions under which these converge or differ. Using panel
data over 1990-2010 and a novel indicator of bureaucratic autonomy, we
then estimate the separate effect of state capacity and bureaucratic auton-
omy on two of the MDGs indicators: child mortality and the prevalence
of tuberculosis. The evidence suggests that a) bureaucratic autonomy has
a stronger impact than commonly used measures of state capacity; and b)
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both bureaucratic autonomy plays a more important role for these indicators
than traditional macroeconomic variables.
Keywords: state capacity - institutions - bureaucracies - millennium development
goals - child mortality - tuberculosis
JEL codes: I38 D73 O43 O50
1 Introduction
In the ongoing debate over the role of institutions in development, state capacity
has emerged as a suggested catalyst of desirable social and economic outcomes.
In this scholarly discussion, state capacity is portrayed as a potential source of
strength that can fundamentally shape the implementation and final impact of
policies, regardless of their ideological content and design. Our aim here is to
build on this burgeoning literature and enhance it by analyzing the relationship
between state capacity and the autonomy of the public bureaucracy.
The development of the state capacity concept has been shaped by the work of
scholars from a wide array of disciplines and methodological approaches, seeking
to understand both the effects of state capacity as well as its determinants. Un-
fortunately, the concept is poorly defined and has been stretched to a point where
different scholars fill it with different meanings1. As will be carefully explained
later, an overview of the literature shows that scholars may implicitly or explicitly
refer to at least four different dimensions of capacity: coercive, administrative, fis-
cal and/or legal capacity. In addition, normative and positive questions are often
conflated. Furthermore, within the realm of normative questions, the view of the
appropriate role of a (strong) state typically differs between studies of developed
and developing countries. The following observation by Daron Acemoglu aptly
captures some of this tension:
“While much research in political economy points out the bene-
fits of ‘limited government’, political scientists have long empha-
sized the problems created in many less-developed nations by ‘weak
1See Hendrix (2010), Hanson and Sigman (2011) and Cingolani (2013) for a systematic anal-
ysis on the different dimensions and conceptualizations of state capacity.
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states’, which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to
withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors”
(Acemoglu 2005: 1199).
One of the key areas of contention and confusion around the state capacity concept
concerns the role of “Weberian” bureaucratic attributes. These attributes are given
central and almost defining roles in some of the research on state capacity, while
they receive essentially no attention in other parts of the literature. In the first
group we find influential work by scholars such as Evans (1995), Geddes (1996)
and Evans and Rauch (1999), who focus on the organizational form of the state
and view capacity as the consequence of efficient policy delegation to autonomous
and professional bureaucratic bodies. In the second group, we find an eclectic
group of scholars, including historians (Centeno 2002), political scientists (Fearon
2005) and economists (Dincecco and Prado 2012), who link state capacity to war
and the state’s capacity to centralize power and control the territory.
In this paper we aim to clear up some of this confusion by deepening our under-
standing of the relationship between bureaucratic autonomy and state capacity,
with the ultimate goal of better understanding the role of autonomy and capacity
in achieving fundamental social goals. More specifically, we aim to make the fol-
lowing contributions: first, to explore how traditional theories about bureaucracies
fit within the more recent work on state capacity; second, to present a novel and
objective indicator of bureaucratic autonomy that is comparable across time and
space; and third, to estimate the impacts of both state capacity - in its multi-
ple interpretations - and bureaucratic autonomy on (social) developmental goals.
Along the way, we also survey the state capacity concept and show its versatility
and multidimensionality.
The section that follows contains a historical overview of the different strands of
the state capacity literature as well as the different measurements and definitions
of the concept, with particular emphasis on the importance given to bureaucratic
autonomy. In the third section, we empirically assess the associations between
bureaucratic autonomy and state capacity, using several of the most commonly
employed measures of state capacity. We show that the link between the two is non-
trivial and nonlinear, and that it seems to be dependent on the political context,
which justifies the inclusion of both in empirical analyses of the determinants of
development goals. The fourth section contains the key empirical contributions of
the paper. There, we examine the effects of both state capacity and bureaucratic
autonomy on two policy indicators included in the Millennium Development Goals:
child mortality rates and tuberculosis prevalence. We focus on these indicators
because we view them as indisputable social goals that (essentially) everyone,
across different regime types and ideological leanings, agrees with. We also find
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it plausible, ex ante, that the capacity of the state, for instance to distribute
development aid effectively, could have a significant impact on the success rate of
these goals. When we analyze the development of these indicators between 1990
and 2010, we find that bureaucratic autonomy has a stronger impact than state
capacity, and that both bureaucratic autonomy and state capacity play a more
important role for these indicators than traditional macroeconomic variables such
as GDP growth. The fifth and final section contains preliminary conclusions and
points that merit further discussion and analysis.
2 State capacities: a conceptual overview of the
literature
Although the literature on state capacity gained special momentum over the recent
years, its theoretical roots date back to the ‘statist’ movement of the seventies and
eighties within political sociology, followed by salient works by Theda Skocpol,
Charles Tilly, Peter Evans, Dieter Rueschemeyer, Alfred Stepan, among others.
This movement responds to both previous marxist and pluralist approaches who
postulated, from different paradigms, that the state apparatus was a political arena
occupied by a myriad of societal actors with direct personal interests. Statism, in
contrast, argues that under certain conditions the state can represent a credible
autonomous actor and be independent from social classes and particularistic in-
terests. Two traditions stem from this movement, a first one granting special
attention to the bureaucracy and power delegation, following largely the Weberian
tradition; and a second one, which tends to overlook the organizational specifici-
ties of the state in favor of outcomes mostly related to the control of violence and
fiscal performance.
2.1 The focus on administrative and relational capacity
In 1979 Theda Skocpol published States and Social Revolutions, a comparative
historical account of the mechanisms by which the state’s organizational struc-
tures affected the nature and outcomes of social revolutions in China, Russia and
France. She dedicates much of the volume to show how the lack of full control of
the state apparatus by the aristocratic class is key in creating the void by which
opportunities for social revolutions emerge and trigger fundamental changes in the
state later on. Along similar conceptual lines, Evans, Skocpol and Rueschemeyer’s
Bringing the State Back in (1985) gathers essays that place bureaucracies as inde-
pendent entities at the center of the scene. The book explores the importance of
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autonomic power in the pursuit of different policy goals, such as sectorial indus-
trial development, the management of economic crises, trade policy and conflict
resolution.
The volumes by Michael Mann (1986, 1993) The Sources of Social Power are com-
monly regarded as an illuminating exploration of the complexity surrounding the
power of the state. Here, a distinction is made between despotic and infrastruc-
tural power. While the first refers to the state’s capacity to impose legislation,
the second looks at the actual operational capacity of the state within society, and
the extent to which decisions at the political level can be implemented throughout
the territory. The notion of infrastructural power permeated throughout the lit-
erature and led to numerous debates, in particular geared towards granting more
importance to the street-level bureaucracy (see, for example, Soifer 2008 or Vom
Hau and Soifer 2008).
Taking on a relational approach, Joel Migdal (1988) seeks to better assess the
relationship between the strength of the state vis-a`-vis that of the society. He
considers that a strong society negatively affects states’ capabilities to “achieve the
kinds of changes in society that their leaders sought through state planning, policies
and actions” (: 4). He allows for a broad set of dimensions of state capacity, such
as the ability to “penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources
and appropriate or use resources in determined ways” (: 4). The reason why this
inverse relationship exists, he contends, is because the state is only one of many
organizations seeking to influence people’s lives, and the competition is higher as
more societal organizations emerge with a similar purpose.
Focusing on Latin American countries, Barbara Geddes asks in The Politician’s
Dilemma (1996) which are the factors that determine politicians’ decisions to
appoint public managers on the basis of meritocratic principles in contrast to par-
tisan concerns. She defines state capacity as the implementation power of the
state, a task that falls inherently under the bureaucracy. This implementation
power relies on countries’ chances to build an insulated bureaucracy, which in
turn depends on the advancements towards merit-oriented administrative reforms.
In order to answer the initial question, she introduces the notion of the politi-
cian’s dilemma: a president faces a tradeoff between appointing competent state
managers who increase the chances of fostering growth and development, and ap-
pointing partisan managers to reassure their own support. Which path will be
taken depends on a series of conditions: the leader’s career incentives, the leader’s
position within the party, party discipline, party’s age and the distribution of
parliamentary seats.
In Embedded Autonomy (1995) Peter Evans analyzes the ways in which states’
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transformative capacity has the power to shape structural change and promote
industrial growth in newly-industrializing countries (NICs). The question is not
defined in terms of how much the state intervenes, but in which ways so that
modern economies are able to fit the global division of labor. Evans argues that
the range of actions a government can take depends on the different kinds of state
structures in place, or the degree of embedded autonomy, a combination of internal
bureaucratic coherence within agencies and external connectedness with indus-
trial sectors. Depending on the level of embedded autonomy, in turn, states come
to be either predatory, intermediate or developmental, a classification extensively
explored in Evans (1989), and further expanded in discussions about the develop-
mental and rentier state (e. g. Karl 1997; Moore 1998, Kohli 2004, Whitfield and
Therkildsen 2011).
In line with Evans, Linda Weiss (1998) explores the transformative capacity of
states against the backdrop of globalization. Similarly, she contends that the
level of state intervention is not informative of its power, whereas transformative
capacity is. The latter is conceived as “the ability [of the state] to coordinate
industrial change to meet the changing context of international competition” (:
7). Weiss studies the somewhat contradictory relationship between transformative
and distributive capacity, through five case studies: Taiwan, Japan, South Korea,
Sweden, and Germany. She finds that transformative capacity dominated the
emerging economies of Taiwan and South Korea, whereas distributive capacity
remained at the core of the Swedish economy. Distributive capacity granted high
density to state-society relations, but hindered innovation within the industrial
sector. The remaining two countries, Germany and Japan constitute two examples
of a combination of both capacities. Weiss emphazises the persistence of the state’s
centrality in the economy, challenging mainstream views about the demise of the
state in a growing globalized world.
In an important effort to collect comparable and systematic data on bureaucratic
professionalism, Evans and Rauch (1999) design and build the Weberian State
Dataset, a dataset made of surveys examining bureaucratic features such as meri-
tocratic recruitment, salary arrangements and career paths in 35 developing (semi-
industrialized) countries, with cross-sectional data representing the period 1970-
1990. Their findings show strong associations between ‘Weberianness’ and eco-
nomic growth. Also, Rauch and Evans (2000) find significant associations between
bureaucratic ‘Weberianness’ and state effectiveness, measured with a number of
different sources of data.
More recently, the interest in state capacity understood from the perspective of
professionalized bureaucracies can perhaps be observed in the work of Ba¨ck and
Hadenius (2008) assessing the relationship between state capacity and democ-
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racy, or the scholarship coming from the QoG survey on public administration,
which seeks to measure to which extent administrations are impersonal in the
implementation of their policies (Dahlstro¨m, Lapuente and Teorell 2010, among
others).
2.2 Other notions of state capacity: coercive, fiscal and
legal capacity
The work of Charles Tilly on the origins of state formation (1975) started a long
and fertile stream of literature highlighting the importance of war episodes in
taxation and the subsequent centralization of coercive capacity in the hands of
national states. This collection of essays shows the variations in state formation
processes in Western Europe as a function of warmaking and the search for central-
ized strategies to raise government revenue. This historical account is completed
and complemented in Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Tilly
1992).
Following the tradition of Charles Tilly, Margaret Levi (1989) grants attention
to the state’s capability to provide collective goods by raising revenue. While
in Tilly’s work this depended on the episodes of external conflict, Levi looks at
internal political conditions, and in particular, to the insecurity of leaders’ mandate
duration, the transaction costs associated with revenue raising, and the ruler’s
overall bargaining power. Methodologically, she chooses a set of case studies,
selected according to different levels of state development and the exposure to
some sort of historical change.
The importance of state capacity in development also acquired particular rele-
vance in the conflict literature, this time not focusing on emerging or developed
economies, but on failed or weak states and their lack of coercive capacity. Engaged
in a debate with Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004), Fearon (2005) shows that among the
factors that facilitate guerrilla warfare and insurgency are low financial, organi-
zational, and political state capacities (: 75). DeRouen and Sobek (2004) find
a similar result, although they differentiate between army’s strength and state
capacity.
More recently, there has been a proliferation of the economic literature interested
in explaining leaders’ investments in state capacity, that progressively promoted
the convergence between the interest in fiscal capacity building and conflict.
The work of Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2006), for example, seeks to under-
stand how inefficient states arise and persist in the framework of a game-theoretic
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analysis. Their understanding of state efficiency involves the abilities of a cen-
tral authority to monitor bureaucrats, which is, in turn, dependent on previous
investments in this capacity.
Besley and Persson (2007, 2008, 2009) do extensive work on the determinants of
state capacity. In their framework, capacity building is seen as an investment
made by incumbents as a function of future levels of social valuation for public
goods, with a format of investments under uncertainty. In Besley and Persson
(2008) they analyze how self-interested incumbents decide to use part of the gov-
ernment’s revenue to invest in fiscal capacities that enable higher tax extraction
from society in the future. Raising public revenue is key to provide a higher level
(or a better quality) of public goods, in this case exemplified by defense against
external threats. They show theoretically how two types of exogenous conflicts,
internal insurgency and external war, affect the value that societies grant to public
goods, and as a consequence, the relevance of investing in fiscal capacities. The
model predicts that the expectation of future external conflict will raise today’s
investments in fiscal capacity, and all sectors of society will be taxed equally, so as
to optimize revenue raising. In contrast, the expectation of future internal conflict
has the opposite effect: as all fiscal capacity is destroyed when internal conflict
occurs, the value of public goods decreases, incumbents favor their own group in
society with redistribution, and no public goods are provided.
In an extended model, Besley and Persson (2007, 2009) also analyze investments in
legal capacity as an endogenous policy decision. Legal capacity is understood as the
capacity to protect and enforce property rights, a market-supporting institution.
Apart from conditioning investments on internal and external conflict, they also
show that other political factors can change the value of public goods, such as the
level of inclusiveness of institutions (capturing political polarization), the level of
political stability, and whether the political regime resembles that of a utilitarian
planner or a politically-controlled one. Several findings arise from their model:
investments in legal and fiscal capacity are complementary; wealthier countries
choose higher levels of both types of capacity; greater political stability raises
investments in state capacity; a more representative political system (meaning,
closer to the utilitarian planner ideal) also raises investments in both capacities;
and finally, the higher the wealth of the ruling group, the higher the investments
in legal capacity, and the lower in fiscal capacity.
Besley and Persson (2011) add a new component to their previous works: the rein-
forcing relationship between low state capacity and violence. Here, state capacity
is defined as the “institutional capability of the state to carry out various policies
that deliver benefits and services to households and firms” (Besley and Persson
2011: 6). The volume argues that a process of ‘clusterization’ occurs, where low
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income, low state capacity and high violence take place at the same time. The
conclusions suggest that stable politics, along with consensual institutions and a
higher demand for public goods are more conducive to greater investments in state
capacities.
Dincecco and Katz (2012) present robust empirical evidence showing strong as-
sociations between extractive and productive state capacity and GDP per capita
over a four-century period in 11 European nations. Dincecco and Prado (2012)
confirm the effects of fiscal capacity on economic performance by instrumenting
fiscal capacity with war casualties from 1816 to 1913 in various world regions.
2.3 State capacity: attributes in common
This brief historical overview shows only some of the most popular works un-
raveling both the causes and effects of state capacity, allowing a wide array of
conceptual lenses. The dimensions of state capacity that have attracted the great-
est attention are perhaps the coercive power of the state as an essential feature to
maintain territorial unity in the context of conflict; the bureaucratic or adminis-
trative capacities to provide a stable provision of public goods through a somewhat
autonomous bureaucracy; and the extractive or fiscal capacity of states in order
to both centralize coercive power and to provide other socially-desirable public
goods. A set of state capacity measurements is listed in the Appendix 6.1. This
list is an extract from Cingolani (2013) and presents references to the articles or
volumes where the issue of state capacity is directly or indirectly tackled, as well
as the chosen measurement in each case and the dimension of capacity authors
emphazise the most.
One observation that can be made on the basis of this succint review is that
most definitions of state capacity refer to some kind of policy execution potential.
Because this execution potential can come from different sources, the literature
has not always assumed a particular organizational structure of the state. That is,
execution potential can certainly come from having a professional and insulated
bureaucracy, but (at least in the short term), it can also be attributed to high
government revenue or strong leadership, which may or may not be associated
with the first.
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3 Bureaucratic Autonomy and State Capacity:
an empirical assessment of the association
The theoretical exploration shows that state capacity encompasses multiple dimen-
sions, and that certain strands of literature assume that bureaucratic autonomy is
a component of state capacity, while others do not. As it becomes interesting to
further unravel this relationship, this section goes one step forward by addressing
the question: what is the empirical association between bureaucratic autonomy
and the various measures of state capacity that scholars have presented?
For this purpose, we will present correlations between a number of proxies of
state capacity used in different works, and our proposed measure of bureaucratic
autonomy, pooling historical data from between as early as 1960 and as late as
2010.
Regarding the first, we replicate some of the most popular measures of state capac-
ity used in the literature (see the list in section 6.1 in the Appendix). Regarding
bureaucratic autonomy, our proposed original measure is explained in the next
subsection. Although the notion of bureaucratic autonomy involves substantial
complexity in itself, the way it is conceived here follows the Weberian and Wilso-
nian traditions of relative separation between politics and administration2, and is
broadly defined as the de facto non-alignment of political cycles and the cycles
of autonomous bureaucracies. However relevant, bureaucratic autonomy from pri-
vate interest groups is not considered at this point. We describe both bureaucratic
autonomy and state capacity measures in Table 1.
2See for example, Weber (1978 Vol. II); Wilson (1897 in Arthur 1966); Goodnow 2003.
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Table 1: Bureaucratic Autonomy and State Capacity: Data description
Variable Description Source Countries (Years) Mean St. Dev Min Max
Bureaucratic
Autonomy
Measures the level of
politicization of
bureaucratic appointments,
based on data from central
banks.
Own compilation
based on Dreher,
Strum and deHaan
(2010)
96 (1970-2010) -0.394 0.409 -0.928 0.833
Control of
Corruption
Experts perception of
corruption in both the
private and public sectors.
International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG)
143 (1984-2010) 2.14 1.18 0 4
Control of
Corruption
Levels of corruption based
on data from TI
Heritage Foundation
and TI
163 (1994-2006) 40.26 26.43 0 100
CPI Corruption Perception
Index from expert
assessments
Transparency
International
181 (1995-2010) 4.31 2.27 0.4 10
Property Rights Measures the legal
protection of property
rights, risk of expropriation
and contract compliance
Heritage Foundation 163 (1994-2006) 50.61 23.81 10 90
Rule of Law Measures levels of
compliance with the law
World Bank
Governance
Indicators
194 (1996-2009) -0.75 0.99 -2.68 2.12
Contract
Intensive Money
Proportion of the money
supply held in the banking
system (M2-M1/M2)
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
179 (1960-2010) 0.474 1.322 -96.296 0.970
Government
Revenue
Government revenue as
share of GDP
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
146 (1990-2010) 25.35 10.72 0.334 65.26
Income Tax II Taxes on income, profits
and capital gains as share
of total taxes
World Development
Indicators
146 (1990-2010) 34.11 16.81 0.575 100
Income Tax Taxes on income, profits
and capital gains as share
of total revenue
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
145 (1990-2010) 21.92 12.76 0.013 66.715
Fiscal Capacity
I
1 - Share of Trade tax World Development
Indicators (WDI)
138 (1990-2010) 0.878 0.130 0.353 1.162
Fiscal Capacity
II
1 - (Share of income tax +
Share of trade tax)
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
136 (1990-2010) 0.67 0.162 0.227 0.983
Fiscal Capacity
III
Share of income tax *
Share of government
revenue
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
141 (1990-2010) 0.057 0.043 0.0005 0.28
Fiscal Capacity
IV
Tax revenue as share of
GDP
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
146 (1990-2010) 0.166 0.074 0.0008 0.589
Primary
Commodity
Exports
Sum of food, fuel,
agricultural and ores
exports as share of total
merchandise exports
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
182 (1962-2010) 60.76 37.28 1.308 821.852
Tax from
exports
Total exports as share of
GDP
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
181 (1960-2010) 34.154 22.743 0.183 243.436
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Table 1: Bureaucratic Autonomy and State Capacity: Data description (cont.)
Variable Description Source Countries (Years) Mean St. Dev Min Max
Military
Personnel
Military personnel in
thousands
Correlates of War
(COW)
197 (1946-2007) 169.048 522.99 0 12500
Military
Expenditure
Ln of Military Expenditure
in constant US dollars
Correlates of War
(COW)
197 (1946-2007) 12.187 2.477 3.367 20.13
State Fragility State Fragility Index Polity 4 163 (1995-2010) 9.823 6.692 0 25
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices
(annual %)
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
177 (1961-2010) 30.417 383.051 -21.675 23773.13
Road Density Km of road per 100 sq. km
of land area
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
179 (2001-2009) 111.157 328.222 0 3850
Military in
Politics
Experts perception on the
military participation in
government
International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG)
143 (1984-2010) 3.718 1.82 0 6
GDP per capita Log of GDP per Capita,
PPP (Constant
International USD)
World Development
Indicators (WDI)
178 (1980-2008) 8.417 1.273 5.016 11.466
3.1 Measuring Bureaucratic Autonomy
Finding adequate measures of civil service characteristics that are deep in time
and comparable across countries has been a long standing and rather unsuccessful
challenge, as pointed out by Fukuyama (2012, 2013).
A number of projects have systematically studied national bureaucracies. As men-
tioned earlier, one of the first is the Weberianness Survey by the University of Cal-
ifornia San Diego (Evans and Rauch 1999). This survey comprised 35 emerging
economies and collected data with time-invariant values representing the period
1970-1990. Although country scores were based on interviews with key stake-
holders, the questions sought to uncover objective patterns in the public admin-
istration in three main areas: meritocratic recruitment, career paths and salary
schemes.
Also, the PRS group commercializes data on bureaucratic quality as part of the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which exists for a large number of
countries since 1984. The index is based on experts’ assessments and published on a
yearly basis. Although criticized for its lack of transparency (e.g. Fukuyama 2012),
ICRG’s index of Bureaucratic Quality has been used to measure state capacity in
articles particularly interested in administrative features of the state.
In 2005, the World Bank started to publish their IDA Resource Allocation In-
dex (IRAI), based on data from the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
(CPIA). CPIA data assigns scores to 77 countries in 16 different policy and insti-
tutional items, divided in four areas: economic management, structural policies,
policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and insti-
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tutions. Within the latter, there is one particular item measuring the quality of
public administration. It defines six different levels of quality, based on policy
coordination and responsiveness, implementation efficiency, merit and ethics, and
payment schemes.
Another interesting source of data on the bureaucracy comes from the Global In-
tegrity Index (GII) by the NGO Global Integrity. This index started in 2004 and
has assessed 109 countries on different aspects of governance (although with high
variance in the number of waves for each country and their regularity). In par-
ticular, the indicator Civil Service: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards and Political
Independence computes experts’ appraisal of the legal measures in place to protect
the civil service from politicization.
More recently, the Quality of Government Institute launched a web survey meant
to capture the impartiality of the public service in 58 countries, with insights from
528 country experts (Dahlstro¨m, Lapuente and Teorell 2010). It comprises ques-
tions assessing the degree of politicization and favoritism in the implementation of
policies.
These indicators suffer from a series of limitations: lack of time variation and
limited coverage of countries (Evans and Rauch 1999; Dahlstro¨m, Lapuente and
Teorell 2010), very short panels (CPIA, GII), non-systematic coverage of coun-
tries (GII), lack of full clarity in the scoring criteria (CPIA and ICRG), lack of
objective measurements (as opposed to perception-based), which is the case of all
of the above mentioned sources. Comprehensive, objective and sensible ways to
measure bureaucratic features exist, but unfortunately data are cross-sectional and
comprising only 16 European countries (Gilardi and Maggetti 2010; Hanretty and
Koop 2009). Additionally, the concept of bureaucratic autonomy entails a level of
complexity that has made it difficult to find consensus regarding its operational-
ization (Christensen 2010).
We are therefore left with no objective indicators for bureaucratic autonomy with
time series variation, and are forced to look for proxy variables instead. After
careful consideration of various literatures on bureaucratic capacity and auton-
omy, we choose to use objective data on the politicization of removals of central
bank governors, in countries where central banks enjoy formal autonomy and fixed
mandates for their head executives. We gather this data simply by computing
whether removals occur before the governor’s legal mandate is due, which allows
to capture a more general de facto correlation between political and bureaucratic
cycles in the areas in which the bureaucracy is expected to be autonomous.
We resort to one of the many variables included in the comprehensive database
compiled by Dreher, Strum and de Haan (2010), which informs whether central
13
bank governor turnovers are regular or irregular, in 158 territorial units (countries
and banking unions) over the period 1970-2011. This regularity is defined in re-
lation to their legal mandate, where rotations occurring before the legal date are
considered irregular. On this basis, we propose the following measure of bureau-
cratic autonomy:
AUTit =
∑t
s=1RegTORis −
∑t
s=1 IrregTORis
1 +
∑t
s=1RegTORis +
∑t
s=1 IrregTORis
(1)
AUTit measures the annual cumulative ratio of irregular to regular turnovers over
the preceding 20-year period, arising from data from as early as 1970 (the index
is therefore computed from 1990 until 2010). It has a rather straightforward in-
terpretation: negative measures indicate that most of the turnovers (TOR) have
been irregular and positives indicate the opposite. We consider here that more
occurrences of regular turnovers means a more autonomous life for the agency.
By resorting to a de facto measure, the indicator does not necessarily pick up the
effect of legal reforms (except indirectly through changes in legal mandates).
The assumption that central bank autonomy is representative of overall bureau-
cratic autonomy is of course a rather strong one. Although it would be ideal to
gather data on various autonomic state agencies for every country and every year,
so far we find only comprehensive data for central banks. However, we believe
this assumption to be supported by previous theoretical work. For instance, Gi-
lardi’s extensive work on how to operationalize agency autonomy (2002, 2005a,
2008) is directly inspired by the literature on central bank independence and the
aim of extending a similar approach to other agencies (Gilardi and Maggetti 2010:
3-4).
We also find support for our choice in the work of North, Wallis, Weingast and
Webb, where courts and central banks are regarded as key areas that should main-
tain their autonomy from rulers: “In a mature LAO [limited-access order], the
government’s commitments to policies and institutions can be more credible [than
in fragile or basic LAOs] because elite private organizations are in a position to put
economic pressure on the government to abide by its commitments. This ability
arises as private organizations act to protect their interests in the differentiation
and autonomy of public institutions, such as courts and the central bank” (North,
Wallis, Weingast and Webb 2011: 18-19).
In addition, the scatterplots of Appendix 6.2 show positive and significant cor-
relations between our proxy of bureaucratic autonomy and three out of the four
alternative measures of bureaucratic independence and quality.
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3.2 Data and analysis
Once we have laid out our novel and objective indicator of bureaucratic autonomy,
and selected a number of indices of state capacity from the literature, we run a
series of bivariate correlations.
Table 1 describes the variables and presents descriptive statistics for the data used
in these bivariate correlations. Table 2 presents panel bivariate correlations be-
tween our proxy measure of bureaucratic autonomy (AUTit) and commonly used
operationalizations of state capacity. In order to test the possibility of context-
dependence in the relationship between state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy,
the full sample of observations is divided into autocracies, anocracies and democ-
racies. A country in a given year is an autocracy if the index Polity2 from the
database PolityIV is less than -5; anocracies are between -5 and 5 and democracies
are those above 5 (Marshall and Jaggers 2013). At first glance, the correlations
show that there is no clearly positive or negative correlation between the two. How-
ever, an interesting pattern seems to arise from the correlations: state capacity is
negatively correlated with autonomy in most of the cases within the sub-sample
of autocracies, no clear pattern arises from the sub-sample of anocracies, and a
positive relationship is shown in democracies.
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Table 2: Bivariate Correlations: Bureaucratic Autonomy and State Capacity
Dimension SC measure Autocracies Anocracies Democracies
Administrative Bureaucratic Quality -0.1466 0.1234∗∗∗ 0.1234 ∗
Control of corruption (ICRG) 0.0856 0.1500 0.1706∗
Control of corruption (HF) -0.1564 0.0819 0.1117
CPI -0.0685 0.1329 0.1392
Legal Property Rights -0.0526 0.2024 0.0623
Rule of Law -0.4110∗∗ 0.0232 0.0591
Contract intensive money -0.3026∗∗∗ 0.0385 -0.0207
Fiscal Government Revenue 0.0490 -0.0989 0.1001
Income Tax -0.3433 0.1330 0.1035
Income Tax II -0.1950 0.1643 0.1265
Fiscal capacity I -0.5006∗∗∗ -0.0392 -0.0656
Fiscal capacity II -0.1417 -0.1501 -0.2350∗∗
Fiscal Capacity III -0.1350 0.0029 0.1325
Fiscal Capacity IV 0.2670 -0.0544 0.0952
Primary commodity exports (R*) 0.1096 0.1489 -0.0584
Tax from exports 0.3356∗∗∗ 0.1180 -0.0527
Coercive Military Personnel -0.12∗∗∗ -0.1688∗∗ -0.0726
Log of Military Expend -0.3537∗∗∗ -0.3064∗∗∗ 0.1046
State Fragility (R*) (Pol4) 0.2776 0.0871 0.0350
Others Inflation (R*) 0.0099 -0.0336 ∗∗ -0.0417∗∗
Road Density -0.1634 0.5408∗∗∗ -0.0207
Military in Politics -0.0751 0.3176∗ 0.1074
GDPpc (log) -0.385∗∗∗ -0.0117 0.1039
Notes: R* indicates a reversed scale, meaning that higher values of the variable
represent less capacity. Stars indicate significance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. These levels are adjusted by the clustering within countries.
A cautious interpretation of this could be that the indicator captures the true
level of autonomy only in consolidated democracies, and that in the case of au-
tocracies and anocracies the measurement is less reliable. Another interpretation
is that while bureaucratic autonomy and state capacity converge in the context
of consolidated democracies, they significantly differ in anocracies and autocra-
cies. In these types of polities, it is apparent that capacity, if anything, is coming
from sources other than bureaucratic autonomy. In any case, the correlations sug-
gest that the relationship between state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy is
not homogeneous and that it should be interpreted in the context of the different
regimes’ characteristics. This basic evidence can in principle sustain and reconcile
the different links between bureaucratic autonomy and state capacity observed in
the literature: bureaucratic autonomy is a credible component of state capacity in
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certain conditions, but not always.
4 The Impacts of Bureaucratic Autonomy and
State Capacity on the MDGs
This section’s purpose is to move beyond conceptual considerations and test whether
both state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy levels have significant impacts on
a series of policy goals. So far, research has provided evidence of the positive
and significant impact of state capacity on economic performance (Evans and
Rauch 1999, Dincecco and Katz 2012; Dincecco and Prado 2012; Hamm, King
and Stuckler 2012) and peace (Sobek 2010; Braithwaite 2010). Here, it is the goal
to empirically estimate and compare the effects of state capacity and bureaucratic
autonomy on two indicators of the Millennium Development Goals: child mortality
and tuberculosis prevalence rates. As mentioned in the introduction, we focus on
these indicators because we view them as sensible social outcomes that are likely
to be indisputable as social goals across (essentially) every country and regime
type. We also find it plausible, ex ante, that the capacity of the state, for instance
to distribute development aid effectively, to accumulate expertise and human re-
sources, or to grant stability to policy implementation mechanisms, could have a
significant impact on whether a country is successful in achieving these goals.
There have been numerous statistical studies assessing the determinants of child
mortality and tuberculosis levels. The work of Wang (2003) uses Demographic
and Health Survey data (DHS) to unravel the factors that affect infant and child
mortality in 60 low-income countries. Among other findings, the work shows that
urbanization determines a faster reduction in mortality, as well as access to electric-
ity, income levels, children’s vaccination in their first year, and health expenditure.
Gakidou et al. (2010) use time series data for 175 countries to tackle a similar
question. They assemble a comprehensive database on educational attainment and
find that increases in the years of education of women in reproductive age (between
15 and 44) substantially reduce child mortality levels on a year-to-year basis be-
tween 1970 and 2009. In addition to the traditional health factors, Leipziger et al.
(2003) also find an important role played by access to basic infrastructure, such
as access to piped water and improved sanitation. Liu et. al. (2012) account for
the most recent trends in child mortality, showing a global decrease of more than
25% in the ten years from 2000 to 2010. Its findings show that neonatal compli-
cations and infectious diseases such as pneumonia, diarrhea, and malaria explain
a substantial proportion of the primary causes of child mortality.
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Regarding tuberculosis, Dye et al. (2009) find that higher scores in the Human
Development Index (HDI), lower levels of child mortality, and proper access to
improved sanitation accelerate the decrease in tuberculosis incidence, although
this rate varies substantially in different world regions. In a comprehensive review
of six empirical studies, Lo¨nnroth et al. (2010) conclude that a clear log-linear
relationship exists between Body Mass Indexes (BMI) and the incidence of tuber-
culosis. The work of Hargreaves et al. (2011) focuses on the social determinants
of tuberculosis, and develops a framework based on data from the Commission
on Social Determinants of Health (CSDH) and WHO that suggests that social
protection mechanisms, as well as effective urban planning interventions should be
considered in analyzing progress in tuberculosis control.
We build on all of this previous work on the determinants of child mortality and
tuberculosis levels. However, our primary focus here is on the role of political and
government aspects, as a lot less is known about how these affect the MDGs. One
notable exception is the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
and the Pacific (UNESCAP) report of 2007, centered around the role of governance
in the provision of basic services to the poor. It stresses the importance of good
governance in overcoming barriers to access, and argues that certain principles such
as inclusiveness, transparency and civic participation facilitate the achievement of
MDGs (UNESCAP 2007). The analysis also contributes to discussions about the
role of Weberianness in poverty reduction more generally (e.g. Henderson et al.
2007).
We contribute to the discussion on the determinants of the two MDGs, child
mortality and tuberculosis levels, by placing the focus on much less explored factors
linked to governance and institutions, such as bureaucratic autonomy and state
capacity. Our estimations measure the effect of a series of policy, institutional and
economic variables on the evolution of child mortality and tuberculosis prevalence.
The selection of determinants is informed by previous studies on the subject. The
estimation equations with all covariates are:
CHmorti,t = α+ β1AUTi,t + β2CAPi,t + β3DEMi,t + β4GDPpci,t−1 + β5GROWTHi,t−1
+ β6POPGri,t + β7ATTAINi,t−1 + β8URBi,t−1 + β9IMMUNi,t−1 + β11WATERi,t−1+
β12SFIi,t + β13HEALTHi,t−1 + β14SOCi,t−1 + β15EDUCi,t−1 + ui + i,t
(2)
and similarly:
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TBprevi,t = α+ β1AUTi,t + β2CAPi,t + β3DEMi,t + β4GDPpci,t−1 + β5GROWTHi,t−1
+ β6POPGri,t + β7ATTAINi,t−1 + β8URBi,t−1 + β9IMMUNi,t−1 + β11WATERi,t−1+
β12SFIi,t + β13HEALTHi,t−1 + β14SOCi,t−1 + β15EDUCi,t−1 + ui + i,t
(3)
Tables 3 and 4 provide an empirical assessment of the relationships formulated in
eqs. (2) and (3) respectively. The first dependent variable (CHmort) is the annual
mortality rate among children under 5 (per 1,000) taken from the World Devel-
opment Indicators of the World Bank3. The second dependent variable (TBprev)
is the annual level of tuberculosis prevalence (per 100,000 people) also taken from
WDI4. Both tables include a basic set of determinants (specifications 1 and 3) as
well as an extended group of covariates (2 and 4), as expressed in eqs. (2) and
(3).
The baseline specification includes institutional, economic, demographic and in-
frastructural determinants, following the bulk of the literature on child mortality
and tuberculosis, and the specific interest in state capacity and institutions. The
first explanatory variable is bureaucratic autonomy (AUT) as presented in eq. (1).
The second is a measure of state capacity (CAP): yearly levels of tax revenue as
share of GDP, taken from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS-IMF)5. Al-
though there are several proxies for state capacity, this is one of the most widely
used and accepted. A continuous measure of democracy levels is added as well
(DEM), taken from the Polity2 indicator of the Polity IV project updated to 2011.
The lags of per capita GDP (GDPpc) and GDP growth (GROWTH) levels are
collected from the New Angus Maddison database. Estimations also include the
most acknowledged determinants of child mortality and TB prevalence: a) a mea-
sure of population growth (annual %) taken from WDI (POPgr); b) the lag of
the levels of educational attainment levels of women in reproductive age (15-44)
(ATTAIN), with data from Gakidou et al. (2010) and complemented with Barro
and Lee (forthcoming) for the year 2010; c) the lag of urbanization rates (URB),
3Under-five mortality rate is the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before
reaching age five, if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. Data on child mortality as
well as tuberculosis prevalence are downloaded from the World Bank Open Database (Azevedo
2011).
4The prevalence of tuberculosis is the estimated number of pulmonary, smear positive, and
extra-pulmonary tuberculosis cases (WHO 2011).
5GFS has two bases of measurement for all their variables: cash and non-cash (i. e. disburse-
ments versus commitments). Countries have tended to shift from cash to non-cash (accrual)
accountancy systems, and although both are considered in order to maximize the number of ob-
servations, a small non-systematic bias arises during transitions. The non-cash basis is preferred
when both measures are available.
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understood as the share of the population living in urban areas; d) the lag of access
to safe water (WATER), and finally e) we construct a measure of immunization
levels (IMMUN), averaging the share of one-year-old children immunized against
hepatitis B, BCG and Polio. These three measures are taken from the World Bank
Open Database (Azevedo 2011).
The extended specifications add three policy measures showing sectoral govern-
ment expenditures: the lags of health (HEALTH), education (EDUC) and social
protection (SOC) expenditure as a share of GDP, from GFS (IMF)6; as well as
a State Fragility Index (SFI) from Polity IV7 (only available since 1995) in order
to control for conflicts or other shocks that might drag changes in the levels of
bureaucratic autonomy. Section 6.3 in the Appendix shows descriptive statistics
for all the variables in the estimations.
Data are cross-national time-series for the period 1990-2010 (unbalanced), and
estimations are run with both random (RE) and fixed effects (FE) in order to
capture unobservable time-invariant determinants (ui). Standardized ‘beta’ coef-
ficients and significance levels are reported. Tables 3 and 4 also report the number
of observations, the overall R2, and for the RE specifications also the p-value of
the Hausman specification test in order to assess the suitability of RE vs. FE
assumptions.
4.1 Results
The four specifications of Table 3 show somewhat similar results in terms of the
explanatory variables’ effects on child mortality. The Hausman test in this case,
however, suggests that only the fixed effects model should be ultimately considered.
Column 3 shows a highly significant and inverse relationship between bureaucratic
autonomy and the levels of child mortality, while a smaller significance and coef-
ficient are found for state capacity (tax revenue). Democracy does not exert such
an effect. Of the two macroeconomic variables, GDP per capita and GDP growth,
only GDP per capita is significantly associated to lower levels of child mortality.
In contrast, the more popular determinants of child mortality such as female ed-
ucational attainment, urbanization, immunization and safe water access show a
significant inverse effect. Population growth, on the other hand, exerts no effect.
When the specification is extended in column 4, all variables retain their sign
and significance, with the exception of GDP per capita and state capacity, which
6The same criterion is applied as in the Tax Revenue variable.
7SFI combines scores on eight dimensions of stateness, ranging from 0 (no fragility) to 25
(extreme fragility): security, political, economic and social a) legitimacy and b) effectiveness
(Marshall and Jaggers 2013).
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become insignificant. Of the policy variables only health expenditure appears as
significant, although with a positive sign. This may be indicating a case of reverse
causation, by which health expenditure effectively responds to child mortality lev-
els. The explanatory power of both columns 3 and 4 is high, ranging from 68% to
73% of variance being explained.
Table 4 estimates the effect of the same set of determinants on TB prevalence. In
this case the Hausman test suggests that both RE and FE are unbiased estimators
for the extended model (columns 2-4), while for the baseline model (columns 1
and 3), only FE should be considered. The FE estimator of the baseline model
(column 3) shows once more a significant and negative association between bu-
reaucratic autonomy and TB prevalence, but in this case a significant and positive
association between the latter and state capacity. Immunization and safe water
access levels also exert a significant impact in the expected direction, although
female education emerges as moderately significant with a positive sign. In the
extended specifications (2 and 4) bureaucratic autonomy, state capacity and GDP
per capita maintain their sign and significance. Immunization levels show again
a strong negative impact, while female education loses overall significance. Social
protection and education expenditure emerge as weakly significant with a positive
sign, suggesting again a potential case of reverse causality. The overall R2 fluctuate
between 24 and 34% when explaining the variance of TB prevalence.
In sum, the overall results in both Tables 3 and 4 suggest that increases in bu-
reaucratic autonomy are strongly associated with reductions in child mortality and
TB prevalence levels over the 1990-2010 period, while the effect of state capacity
is more ambiguous. The results also reinforce the impacts of the traditional de-
mographic and infrastructural determinants found in the literature, in particular
immunization and access to safe water levels. All three policy variables appear
as somewhat relevant for these development outcomes, although the nature of the
association needs to be more carefully assessed.
These results confirm the importance of bureaucratic institutions and state capac-
ity in improving basic welfare standards. When comparing the effects of organi-
zational aspects of state capacity (autonomy) with fiscal ones, it seems that the
former have a stronger effects for the period examined.
To further test this last premise, Tables 5 and 6 test the extended model against
alternative measures of state capacity, in the administrative, legal and coercive di-
mensions, for the same time period and sample of countries. In these, bureaucratic
autonomy emerges as significant at the 1% level in five out of the six specifications,
for both MDG outcome variables. The different state capacity alternatives are neg-
ative and significant for child mortality as well in four out of the six columns. For
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TB prevalence, on the other hands, the evidence on the effect of state capacity
proxied by tax revenue is rather ambiguous.
5 Conclusions
This article has provided a general discussion linking state capacities, bureaucratic
autonomy and two socio-economic development goals. We discussed the theoret-
ical links between state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy, pointing out that
in some strands of the literature -mostly the earlier works- ‘state effectiveness’ or
‘state capacity’ presuppose the existence of professional and politically insulated
Weberian bureaucracies, whereas other strands -mainly those concerned with con-
flict and development- do not necessarily address bureaucratic autonomy. We also
delineated a simple strategy to better understand the empirical links between the
two concepts. For this purpose we proposed a minimalist but novel objective in-
dicator for bureaucratic autonomy and linked it with some of the most common
measures of state capacity. The results showed that the nature of this relationship
depends on the political context, and that the association is positive in democ-
racies, while less clear in autocracies and anocracies. This finding suggests that
capacity is composed of other elements in these regimes, and that state capacity
and bureaucratic autonomy should be considered separately whenever state capac-
ity is not narrowly defined. Accordingly, we estimated the distinct effects of state
capacity and bureaucratic autonomy on child mortality rates and the prevalence
of tuberculosis, two indicators of the Millennium Development Goals.
The preliminary results indicate that autonomy is effective in explaining the reduc-
tion of both outcomes over the period 1990-2010. There is an initial hint that the
level of fiscal state capacity, proxied by government tax revenue, is a relevant ex-
planatory factor for child mortality, but in the case of tuberculosis prevalence the
results are counterintuitive and deserve further exploration. Other institutional
determinants such as political regime do not seem to have the same relevance.
In contrast to what may be expected, GDP growth does not seem to have an
impact on the achievement of either MDG goal, whereas the more traditional de-
mographic and infrastructural variables do. The impact of sectoral government
spending needs to be further assessed but the results suggest it bears some rele-
vance.
Moving beyond the direct and detailed interpretation of the regressions, the con-
textual dependence of the convergence between state capacity and bureaucratic
autonomy, in particular the results presented in Section 4, lends support to the
view that institutional development is not a linear process.
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Table 3: Determinants of MDGs: Child mortality (unbalanced sample)
Dep var: Child mortality RE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bureaucratic Autonomy -0.043∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.021) (0.002) (0.008)
Tax Revenue (% GDP) -0.032∗∗ -0.024 -0.027∗ -0.013
(0.039) (0.113) (0.090) (0.412)
Democracy 0.004 -0.025∗∗ 0.010 -0.018
(0.751) (0.037) (0.467) (0.136)
Ln GDP per capita (lag) -0.185∗∗∗ -0.041 -0.165∗∗∗ -0.016
(0.000) (0.323) (0.000) (0.708)
GDP growth (lag) 0.010∗ 0.001 0.009 -0.001
(0.098) (0.895) (0.116) (0.910)
Population growth 0.011 0.005 0.001 -0.009
(0.434) (0.756) (0.926) (0.633)
Female educ attainment (lag) -0.375∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗ -0.355∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urbanization (lag) -0.212∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗∗ -0.584∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Immunization (lag) -0.050∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗
(0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.020)
Safe water access (lag) -0.328∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.249∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State Fragility Index 0.071∗∗ 0.060∗
(0.019) (0.052)
Health expenditure (lag) 0.033∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Social Protection expenditure (lag) -0.005 -0.004
(0.743) (0.783)
Education expenditure (lag) -0.003 -0.014
(0.855) (0.320)
Observations 1005 593 1005 593
R2 (overall) 0.754 0.734 0.726 0.688
Hausman p-value 0.022 0.000
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Determinants of MDGs: Tuberculosis prevalence (unbalanced sample)
Dep var: TB prevalence RE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bureaucratic Autonomy -0.042∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.003) (0.025) (0.001)
Tax Revenue (% GDP) 0.110∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Democracy -0.008 -0.018 -0.013 -0.022
(0.674) (0.382) (0.540) (0.294)
Ln GDP per capita (lag) -0.473∗∗∗ -0.360∗∗∗ -0.494∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growth (lag) 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.882) (0.815) (0.849) (0.839)
Population growth 0.018 0.007 0.020 0.004
(0.394) (0.828) (0.367) (0.893)
Female educ attainment (lag) 0.140∗∗ 0.137∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.128
(0.030) (0.087) (0.025) (0.169)
Urbanization (lag) -0.107 -0.149 -0.086 -0.013
(0.202) (0.144) (0.487) (0.934)
Immunization (lag) -0.062∗∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗ -0.097∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Safe water access (lag) -0.136∗∗∗ -0.073 -0.153∗∗∗ -0.080
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State Fragility Index -0.033 -0.037
(0.531) (0.494)
Health expenditure (lag) -0.008 -0.009
(0.664) (0.629)
Social Protection expenditure (lag) 0.043∗ 0.046∗
(0.081) (0.066)
Education expenditure (lag) 0.053∗∗ 0.059∗∗
(0.024) (0.017)
Observations 1005 593 1005 593
R2 (overall) 0.344 0.303 0.333 0.247
Hausman p-value 0.000 0.469
Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Determinants of Child Mortality: different dimensions of State Capacity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bureaucratic Autonomy -0.014 -0.058∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.256) (0.000) (0.011) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Bureaucratic Quality -0.037∗∗∗
(0.005)
Freedom from Corruption -0.034∗∗∗
(0.004)
Contract Intensive Money 0.017
(0.194)
Property Rights 0.024∗
(0.091)
Military expenditure (log) -0.080∗∗∗
(0.000)
Military Personnel -0.095∗∗
(0.037)
Democracy -0.023∗ 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.002
(0.063) (0.894) (0.824) (0.881) (0.624) (0.891)
Ln GDP per capita (lag) 0.017 0.006 -0.018 -0.057 0.014 -0.047
(0.695) (0.897) (0.679) (0.260) (0.767) (0.313)
GDP growth (lag) -0.000 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.003
(0.958) (0.393) (0.934) (0.284) (0.354) (0.559)
Population growth -0.010 -0.019 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.012
(0.566) (0.176) (0.491) (0.307) (0.436) (0.440)
Female educ attainment (lag) -0.396∗∗∗ -0.377∗∗∗ -0.374∗∗∗ -0.311∗∗∗ -0.366∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Urbanization (lag) -0.597∗∗∗ -0.579∗∗∗ -0.683∗∗∗ -0.627∗∗∗ -0.620∗∗∗ -0.707∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Immunization (lag) -0.019∗∗ 0.007 -0.014∗ 0.007 -0.006 -0.004
(0.024) (0.442) (0.086) (0.438) (0.506) (0.675)
Safe water access (lag) -0.218∗∗∗ -0.276∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ -0.263∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.272∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State Fragility Index 0.088∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.020) (0.009) (0.012)
Health expenditure (lag) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Social Protection expenditure (lag) -0.022 -0.028∗∗ -0.015 -0.030∗∗ -0.027∗ -0.023∗
(0.125) (0.045) (0.316) (0.034) (0.055) (0.100)
Education expenditure (lag) -0.008 -0.006 -0.010 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.579) (0.706) (0.492) (0.819) (0.750) (0.804)
Observations 537 505 558 505 549 549
R2 (overall) 0.733 0.695 0.695 0.691 0.705 0.698
Fixed effects estimations. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 6: Determinants of Tuberculosis Prevalence: different dimensions of State
Capacity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bureaucratic Autonomy -0.077∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.072∗∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.151) (0.003) (0.003)
Bureaucratic Quality -0.155∗∗∗
(0.000)
Freedom from Corruption -0.031
(0.160)
Contract Intensive Money 0.052∗∗
(0.024)
Property Rights 0.156∗∗∗
(0.000)
Military expenditure (log) 0.047
(0.220)
Military Personnel 0.016
(0.849)
Democracy -0.012 -0.000 -0.013 -0.008 -0.005 -0.007
(0.608) (1.000) (0.525) (0.733) (0.825) (0.752)
Ln GDP per capita (lag) -0.270∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗ -0.282∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.277∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002)
GDP growth (lag) 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.008 0.002 0.003
(0.882) (0.679) (0.689) (0.377) (0.845) (0.741)
Population growth 0.003 -0.005 0.009 0.005 0.000 0.000
(0.934) (0.844) (0.784) (0.851) (0.995) (0.991)
Female educ attainment (lag) 0.072 0.114 0.145 0.406∗∗∗ 0.117 0.109
(0.479) (0.310) (0.139) (0.000) (0.236) (0.285)
Urbanization (lag) 0.090 -0.035 0.027 -0.134 0.036 0.063
(0.545) (0.846) (0.856) (0.435) (0.821) (0.704)
Immunization (lag) -0.079∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.072∗∗∗ -0.039∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗ -0.058∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000)
Safe water access (lag) -0.129∗∗ -0.047 -0.086 -0.055 -0.066 -0.070
(0.031) (0.531) (0.141) (0.434) (0.310) (0.292)
State Fragility Index -0.021 0.077 0.007 0.011 0.034 0.034
(0.711) (0.179) (0.902) (0.837) (0.536) (0.533)
Health expenditure (lag) -0.006 -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004
(0.731) (0.888) (0.754) (0.718) (0.778) (0.840)
Social Protection expenditure (lag) 0.051∗ 0.024 0.039 0.022 0.037 0.034
(0.067) (0.386) (0.137) (0.411) (0.167) (0.199)
Education expenditure (lag) 0.061∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.062∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.025) (0.048) (0.023) (0.035) (0.018) (0.019)
Observations 537 505 558 505 549 549
R2 (overall) 0.219 0.110 0.159 0.177 0.128 0.125
Fixed effects estimations. Standardized beta coefficients; p-values in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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The topics of state capacity and bureaucratic autonomy deserve an important place
in the discussions about institutions and development, and this paper represents
one contribution within a field where several theoretical and empirical questions
remain unresolved. In the future, similar assessments should seek objective mea-
sures of bureaucratic autonomy that incorporate other bureaucratic agencies than
just central banks and extend the analysis and improve the precision of the rela-
tionships.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Measures of state capacity in the literature
Source: extract from Cingolani (2013).
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6.2 Scatterplots
29
Variable Description Source Countries (Years) Mean St. Dev Min Max
Child Mortality Mortality rate, under 5 years old
(per 1,000)
World Development
Indicators
142 (1990-2010) 62.434 61.054 2.6 311
Tuberculosis
Prevalence
Prevalence of tuberculosis (per
100,000 people)
World Development
Indicators
142 (1990-2010) 210.262 226.515 1.1 1307
Bureaucratic
Autonomy Index
Measures yearly changes in
bureaucratic autonomy (see
table 1)
based on Dreher,
Strum and deHaan
(2010)
94 (1990-2010) -0.435 0.409 -0.928 0.833
Tax revenue Revenue from taxes as share of
GDP, in the budgetary base of
the central government
Government Finance
Statistics,
International
Monetary Fund
120 (1990-2010) 16.106 7.528 0.112 60.48
Democracy Continuous variable measuring
the level of democracy
Polity IV 140 (1990-2010) 2.895 6.764 -10 10
Per capita GDP Ln of GDP per capita, US
dollars, chain series
New Maddison
Historical Datasets
140 (1990-2010) 8.173 1.136 5.315 10.276
GDP growth Annual GDP growth (%) computed from New
Maddison Historical
Datasets
140 (1990-2010) 0.0165 0.066 -0.954 0.625
Population growth Annual population growth (%) World Development
Indicators (World
Bank)
142 (1990-2010) 1.551 1.598 -7.533 18.588
Female Education Mean years of educational
attainment in women in
reproductive age (15-44)
Gakidou et. al. 2010
and Barro and Lee
(forthcoming)
141 (1990-2010) 7.651 3.625 0.3 14.7
Urbanization Population living in urban areas
(%)
World Development
Indicators
142 (1990-2010) 53.870 22.233 5.416 100
Immunization Average of the share of
one-year-old children immunized
against hepatitis B, BCG and
Polio
World Development
Indicators
142 (1990-2010) 83.091 16.270 11.5 99
Safe water Improved water source (% of
population with access)
World Development
Indicators
139 (1990-2010) 81.743 19.370 2 101
State Fragility Index Composite index on 8 stateness
dimensions
Polity IV (2011) 140 (1990-2010) 9.701 6.783 0 25
Health expenditure Health expenditure as share of
GDP, in the budgetary base of
the central government
Government Finance
Statistics,
International
Monetary Fund
107 (1990-2010) 1.442 1.345 -0.008 8.748
Social Protection
expenditure
Social protection expenditure as
share of GDP, in the budgetary
base of the central government
Government Finance
Statistics,
International
Monetary Fund
107 (1990-2010) 3.425 3.888 -0.928 20.069
Education
expenditure
Education expenditure as share
of GDP, in the budgetary base of
the central government
Government Finance
Statistics,
International
Monetary Fund
107 (1990-2010) 2.969 1.834 0.024 14.316
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6.3 State capacities and MDGs: Variables and descriptive
stats
6.4 Correlation Matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Child mortality (1) 1
Tuberculosis Prevalence (2) .617 1
Bureaucratic Autonomy (3) -.014 .023 1
Tax Revenue (4) -.122 -.021 -.083 1
Democracy (5) -.315 -.110 .123 .200 1
Ln GDP per capita (6) -.840 -.564 .059 .257 .336 1
GDP growth (7) -.175 -.064 .015 -.036 -.053 .137 1
Population growth (8) .243 .157 .058 -.020 -.345 -.171 -.159 1
Female educ attainment (9) -.732 -.396 .077 .278 .486 .722 .172 -.344 1
Urbanization (10) -.667 -.479 .106 .134 .149 .737 .019 .014 .595 1
Immunization (11) -.411 -.376 -.197 .092 .020 .260 .066 -.140 .261 .235 1
Safe Water (12) -.816 -.509 .143 .163 .262 .790 .141 -.199 .595 .661 .292 1
State Fragility (13) .783 .511 .000 -.230 -.472 -.827 -.106 .250 -.745 -.629 -.277 -.681 1
Health expend. (14) -.086 -.119 -.046 .434 .044 .122 -.022 .109 .140 .097 .146 .119 -.135 1
Soc Prot. expend. (15) -.421 -.356 -.068 .370 .330 .551 .000 -.167 .498 .410 .076 .412 -.494 .351 1
Educ. expend. (16) .125 .075 -.093 -.119 -.017 -.096 -.164 .197 -.125 -.062 .127 -.113 .040 .500 .119 1
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